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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
On appeal, Mr. May asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it 
denied his motion to withdraw ~1is guilty pleas which was filed and decided prior to 
sentencing. The State's response includes an inaccurate restatement of an argument 
that Mr. May made in his Appellant's Brief, followed by a legal argument that is not 
persuasive, even having been made in response to the inaccurate restatement of his 
argument. 
This Reply Brief is necessary in order to correct the State's inaccurate 
restatement of Mr. May's argument, and to demonstrate the reasons that the State's 
response is not persuasive. Although the State made other arguments, Mr. May will not 
respond to those in this Reply Brief, and will instead rely on the arguments set forth in 
his Appellant's Brief. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. May's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference. 
1 
ISSUE 
Is Mr. May estopped from arguing that the district court abused its discretion when it 
relied on a federal case rather than Idaho case law in deciding his motion to withdraw 
his guilty pleas? 
2 
ARGUMENT 
Mr. May Is Not Estopped From Arguing That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
When It Relied On A Federal Case Rather Than Idaho Case Law In Deciding His 
Motion To Withdraw His Guilty Pleas 
In his Appellant's Brief, one of the arguments advanced by Mr. May concerned 
the district court's extensive reliance on United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245 (4th Cir. 
1991), specifically, 
Mr. May asserts that, in light of its finding that the State had not 
established that it would be prejudiced, the district court abused its 
discretion when it focused on the Moore six-factor analysis, rather than 
simply deciding whether he had established a fair and just reason under 
Henderson.['] 
(Appellant's Brief, p.11.) 
In its Respondent's Brief, the State misconstrues the above argument and then 
responds to the misconstrued argument as follows: 
May also argues that the district court abused its discretion by considering 
standards applied in federal cases for an identical federal rule when 
determining that May failed to establish a just reason for withdrawing his 
guilty plea [sic]. (Appellant's brief, p.11.) May is estopped from making 
this argument as it was May's substitute counsel that originally asserted 
that the federal standard was relevant to his case. (See R., pp.270-71.) If 
the district court erred in considering the federal standard in determining 
whether May had established a just reason for withdrawing his guilty plea 
(sic], that error was invited. State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 402, 3 
P.3d 67, 80 (Ct. App. 2000). 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.6-7.) 
First, in his Appellant's Brief, Mr. May did not argue about the application of 
federal cases to his motion. Rather, Mr. May argued that the district court's reliance on 
1 State v. Henderson, 113 Idaho 411 (Ct. App. 1987). 
3 
a single case from a single federal circuit, rather than relying on Idaho case law that 
does not contain a six-factor test, was an abuse of discretion. 
Second, Mr. May's substitute counsel did not "assert[] that the federal standard 
was relevant to his case." What his substitute counsel wrote with respect to federal law 
is as follows: 
A federal perspective is provided in Kaldwell v. United States, 315 F.2d 
667 (9th Cir. 1963). The court declared: 
Accordingly, Rule 32(d) imposes no limitation upon the 
withdrawal of a guilty plea before sentence is imposed, and 
such leave 'should be freely allowed.' Poole v. United 
States, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 71, 250 F.2d 396, 400 (1957). 
See also Gearhart v. United States, 106 U.S.App.D.C. 270, 
272 F.2d 499, 502 (1959). On the other hand, withdrawal of 
a guilty plea after sentence is conditioned by Rule 32(d) 
upon a showing of 'manifest injustice.' This distinction rests 
upon practical considerations important to the proper 
administration of justice. Before sentencing, the 
inconvenience to court and prosecution resulting from a 
change of plea is ordinarily slight as compared with the 
public interest in protecting the right of the accused to trial by 
jury. But if a plea of guilty could be retracted with ease after 
sentence, the accused might be encouraged to plead guilty 
to test the weight of potential punishment, and withdraw the 
plea if the sentence were unexpectedly severe. The result 
would be to undermine respect for the courts and fritter away 
the time and painstaking effort devoted to the sentencing 
process. 
Id. at p. 670. 
(R., pp.270-71 (internal citation to unquoted footnotes omitted).) 
It can hardly be said that the gratuitous citation to a rather unremarkable federal 
case could be seen as an "assert[ion] that the federal standard was relevant to his 
case." It was prefaced with the statement that it involved "a federal perspective'' and 
was followed by absolutely no argument. Furthermore, there does not appear to be a 
4 
single "federal standard" interpreting the equivalent federal rule. Compare Moore, 931 
F.2d 245 (4th Cir.) (six-factor analysis) with United States v. Thomas, 13 F.3d 151, 152-
53 (5th Cir. 1994) (seven-factor analysis), United States v. Schmidt, 373 F.3d 100, 102-
03 (2d Cir. 2004) (three-factor analysis), United States v. Hanson, 339 F.3d 983, 988 
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (three-factor analysis), United States v. Parrilla-Tirado, 22 F.3d 368, 
371 (1 st Cir. 1994) (five-factor analysis), United States v. Pluta, 144 F.3d 968, 973 (6 th 
Cir. 1998) (seven-factor analysis), United States v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 252 (3d Cir. 
2003) (three-factor analysis), United States v. McTiernan, 546 F.3d 1160, 1166-69 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (no specific factors), United States v. Hamilton, 510 F.3d 1209, 1214 (10th 
Cir. 2007) (seven-factor analysis), United States v. Buckles, 843 F.2d 469, 471-72 (11 th 
Cir. 1988) (four-factor analysis), United States v. Davis, 583 F.3d 1081, 1089 (8th Cir. 
2009) (four-factor analysis), and United States v. Mays, 593 F.3d 603, 606-07 (ih Cir. 
2010) (no specific factors). Finally, the only language contained in the cited-to Ninth 
Circuit opinion concerning a motion to withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing - the 
issue below and in this appeal - is to the one-sentence proposition that "such leave 
'should be freely allowed."' That can hardly be said to amount to an adoption of the 
Fourth Circuit's standard for deciding such motions. 
5 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein and in his Appellant's Brief, Mr. May respectfully 
requests that this Court vacate the judgment of conviction and remand this matter for a 
trial. 
DATED this 2th day of April, 2012. 
S NCERJ.HAHN 
~~~~~te Appellate Public Defender 
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